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This blog is one in a series of blogs on the Future of Ageing, 
published in the lead up to the ILC-UK Future of 
Ageing conference on the 24th November. To register to 
attend this conference, click here. 
 
“No one wins. One side just loses more slowly.” 
This statement, made by Prez, a character on the critically 
acclaimed TV show The Wire, isn’t a bad way to start thinking 
about longevity. Of course no one can live for ever; all we can 
do is lose more slowly, travelling further along the life course to 
reach ever older ages. The life course is a series of hurdles, age 
specific mortality risks, each of varying heights, each of which 
have to be cleared before we can continue to live another year. 
We hope to clear more of these hurdles, travelling further into 
older ages, and hope to do so without sustaining too many 
sprains and injuries (acquiring multiple morbidities) along the 
way. A life expectancy is a way of summarising many 
individual mortality risks faced by populations at different ages, 
a single number for describing the difficulty of the course. 
Thinking of these age specific mortality risks as hurdles of 
different heights, which have to be cleared before someone can 
travel further across the life course, then the life expectancy is 
when around half the people travelling the life course will have 
failed to clear one of these hurdles. 
 
These hurdles are different for males and females: in their late 
teens and early twenties, males experience markedly higher 
mortality rates than females, often from external causes. Plotting 
age specific mortality risks for males compared with females 
shows the mortality risk jumping upwards once the protective 
confines of parental supervision have been shed, producing a 
male ‘plateau of misadventure’ that lasts until around the mid 
thirties for young men; this male excess mortality in young 
adulthood has if anything even tended to increase while overall 
mortality risks at these have fallen, even more so as maternal 
morbidity related to childhood has fallen (alongside infant 
mortality) due to improved medical care.  
But even once the plateau of misadventure has been survived, 
age specific mortality rates due to ageing tend to be higher for 
males than for females; any given mortality hurdle faced by 
women at one age tends to be faced by men at a slightly younger 
age. By older adulthood, from the age of 50 onwards, the 
differences in the placing of particular mortality hurdles for 
males and females tends to be marked and substantive, each 
contributing to the well-known overall differences in life 
expectancies.  
The hurdles also differ between countries: People in England & 
Wales (sadly treated as a single region by many statistical 
agencies) have amongst the highest life expectancies in Western 
Europe, whereas people in neighbouring Scotland have amongst 
the lowest life expectancy. These Scottish deficits in life 
expectancy, compared with England & Wales, are nothing new, 
as the figure XX demonstrates.  
Within figure XX, four shaded contour plots are presented. On 
the horizontal axis, ages are presented, running from 50 one the 
left to 90 on the right. On the vertical axis, successive birth 
cohorts are presented, running upwards from those born in 1860, 
a ‘completed cohort’ whose mortality risks up to the age of 90 
years have already been observed; through to those born in 
1960, who have only just started to reach into their fifties, and 
so whose mortality risks at older ages are therefore 
‘unobserved’.  The white triangles at the top left corners 
therefore show the extent of ‘missing data’ for these newer 
cohorts, and the key reason why population projections, in 
particular projections of the size of older populations likely to 
require large health care needs and pension schemes, can be 
inaccurate. (An issue I will return to later in this blog.) Within 
each of the four subfigures, the same the same colour scheme to 
represent age specific mortality risk, and the same specific 
mortality hurdles, shown as labelled contour lines, are presented 
for each of the four sub-figures. The labels of these contours 
define the base 10 logarithm of the age specific mortality risks 
faced at the ages at which these contours pass through; more 
intuitively, this means the contour labels define the ‘number of 
zeros’ in the mortality risks: -1.0 meaning a 10-1, i.e. 0.1 (10%) 
risk of dying in the next year, -2.0 meaning a 10-2, i.e 0.01 (1%) 
risk, and so on.   
Given this information for orienteering these complex 
demographic topographies, let’s now look first at the older age 
mortality trends for males and females in England & Wales, and 
then compare these against those observed in Scotland.  
 
England & Wales 
In England & Wales, as with everywhere else in Western 
Europe, the overwhelming trend has been for each new birth 
cohort that enters the race to face an easier course to travel from 
the age of 50 years onwards. High hurdles that one cohort used 
to face at the age of 60, for example, later cohorts would instead 
face at the age of 61, 62, 63, and so on. These shifting mortality 
hurdles can be visualised like orienteering maps, with contour 
lines indicating specific mortality risk levels, like specific 
heights above sea levels. By arranging the age specific risks by 
birth cohort on the vertical axis and age on the horizontal 
dimension, we can see these hurdles to have been shifted ever 
further back for almost all cohorts; the notable exception being 
the 1918 birth cohort, hobbled both by the legacy of the First 
World War and the Spanish Flu pandemic which wreaked havoc 
across the world. 
There are important differences between males and females in 
England & Wales: firstly, we see that for males the mortality 
hurdles faced by successive cohorts only shifted to the right (i.e. 
improved) slightly for cohorts born between around 1850 to 
1860, and then hardly changed at all for cohorts born between 
around 1870 to 1900. For perhaps half a century, for those born 
at the height of the British Empire of Queen Victoria, therefore, 
there was very little improvement in mortality risk for males. By 
contrast, for females born during these decades the mortality 
hurdles tended to move progressively to the right, to be delayed 
for each generation to be faced at slightly older ages. There is 
evidence that these improvements increased even more quickly 
after World War 2: a diagonal disruption running top left to 
bottom right is apparent, seen most clearly by looking at the 
contour lines marked -2.0 and -1.8, which shift sharply to the 
right for the 1880 compared with the 1900 cohort in their mid to 
late 50s, and for 1870 to 1890 cohorts in their late 50s and early 
60s. For comparable males, there was no equivalent 
improvement. The diagonal disruption appears only to have 
affected mortality risks in the fifties and sixties, with little 
change in the seventies and eighties. 
For males and females alike, the most rapid improvements in 
these older age mortality risks occurred for those cohorts born 
after World War 1: the pace of the ‘rightwards march’ of the 
mortality hurdles increased rapidly for both genders, and shows 
no sign of stabilising at any age. This is one of the great success 
stories for a great many countries throughout Western Europe 
and North America, though sadly not replicated within Russia 
and former Soviet block countries in Eastern Europe. It also is 
the source of a great many demographic, fiscal and demographic 
challenges now facing the ageing societies of the West. For 
England & Wales, the seat of the once dominant British Empire, 
it suggests that longevity at older age improved most quickly as 
the Empire fell into decline and transformation as a loose 
Commonwealth, and Britain’s military might and imperial 
dominance gave way to the radical social security and state 
reforms, including the formation of the National Health Service, 
which were initiated during World War 2, undertaken in haste 
with the election victory of Labour in 1945, and canonised 
within William Beveridge’s 1942 report Social Security and 
Allied Services.  It is notable that the males and females born 
soon after 1920 would be in their fifties in the 1970s, and had 
spent much of their working life under the Keynesian ‘
Butskellite’ consensus of low unemployment, high social 
security, and high levels of state involvement in economic 
matters. However it is interesting to note that even those cohorts 
who experienced a combination of ‘Butskellite’ and ‘
Thatcherite’ labour markets saw similar levels of mortality 
hurdle improvements in older age: The  post-war consensus 
appeared to ‘switch on’ an acceleration of improvements in 
older age mortality which have not (so far) been ‘switched off
’.  
 
Scotland 
So, how does Scotland compare with England & Wales? Given 
the shared history, economy, population, government and 
geography of these two regions, it can only be expected that 
trends at older ages will be similar. Indeed, females in Scotland 
appear similar to females in England & Wales, in seeing both 
improving older age mortality hurdles earlier than for males. 
And like in England & Wales, for both genders the rate of 
rightwards shift in hurdles accelerated after the 1920 birth 
cohorts.  
However, there are also one or two notable differences: whereas 
for males in England & Wales, for birth cohorts born up until 
around 1900, the older age hurdles were largely static, for males 
in Scotland they appear to be more variable, with some hurdles 
for males in their sixties and early seventies even appearing to 
move to the left. However, given the much smaller population 
size in Scotland compared with England & Wales, especially for 
these cohorts, there is a high risk of misinterpreting ‘noise’ 
for ‘signal’ and the likelihood that male trends for these 
cohorts are similar in both countries cannot be discounted.  
More subtle but impactful differences can be discerned by 
analysing the figures more carefully, and in particular by 
comparing mortality risks for the same cohort and age within the 
two countries. Many such comparisons can be made, but to start 
with compare the top left corners of each of the four subfigures. 
For females in England & Wales, the mortality hurdle -2.6 is 
apparent, and behind it is the darkest blue shade seen within the 
figures, corresponding to the lowest observed mortality risk 
shown in the figure. For females in Scotland, the smallest 
visible mortality hurdle is the next contour, -2.4, and these 
lowest shades are not visible. Similarly, for males, the contour 
labelled -2.4 is visible in the top left corner within England and 
Wales, whereas for males the lowest observed risk is -2.2.  
By looking at each of the labelled contour lines below and to the 
right of these lowest contour lines, and comparing the particular 
ages and cohorts they intersect in Scotland compared with 
people of the same gender in England & Wales, the many small 
differences that contribute to Scotland’s overall lower life 
expectancy becomes clear. Though mortality risks have 
improved similarly in both countries, they have remained 
persistently worse in Scotland compared with England & Wales. 
The data used to produce these figures can also be used to 
estimate the ‘excess’ deaths at different ages, for different 
cohorts, in Scotland compared with England & Wales. 
 
Discussion 
Many life expectancy measures are known as period life 
expectancies, and are equivalent to assuming that each of these 
contour lines, which have been shifting steadily to older ages for 
each cohort, will suddenly stop shifting and become vertical 
lines. They make assumptions about the difficulty of life courses 
not yet travelled which are not compatible with more than a 
century of change. 
The challenge for future healthcare and social provision is that 
we do not know how these mortality hurdles will continue to 
shift, and if we make the wrong assumptions, like the period life 
expectancy assumption, we are likely to be investing far too 
little in healthcare and social care provision than we should have 
been. By seeing how these hurdles have moved, we can at least 
develop a better idea about how they could continue to change 
in the future, and what sort of population and society we are 
likely to become. 
 
Shaded contour plot of age specific mortality risks for birth 
cohorts born from 1850 and 1960 in England & Wales (bottom 
row) and Scotland (top row), and for females (left column) and 
males (right column) over the age range 50 to 90 years. Reds 
indicate higher risks, blues lower risks, and yellows 
intermediate risks. Contours are labelled with log mortality 
risks on a base 10 scale, effectively the ‘number of zeroes’ in a 
mortality risk: -1.0 means a 1-in-10 risk of dying in the next 
year, and -2.0 a 1-in-100 risk of dying in the next year. 
A period life expectancy involves assuming that the mortality 
hurdles will become vertical in the ‘missing’ top right corners of 
the maps.  (Author’s own analysis. Source: Human Mortality 
Database.) 
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